Troubled history of Northen Ireland

The tactic of the hunger strike has a special place in Republican history and has proved very emotive for Nationalists in Ireland throughout the 20th century. The impact that could be achieved on world opinion was clear in 1920 when Terence MacSwiney, then Lord Mayor of Cork, died in Brixton Prison, London, on day 74 of his hunger strike. A passage from a speech he had made at his inauguration as Lord Mayor was to be recalled during the 1981 hunger strike: "it is not those who can inflict the most, but those who can suffer the most who will conquer" [9, p. 33].

Just how much impact the 1981 strike was having on the Nationalist population of Ireland became clear when Bobby Sands was elected a Member of Parliament (MP) during a by-election for the Fermanagh / South Tyrone seat and two other hunger strikers were elected as Teachta Dáil (TDs) in a general election in the Republic of Ireland.

The hunger strike ended on 3 October 1981 when those Republican prisoners who had still been refusing food decided to end their hunger strike. At this stage in the protest six prisoners were on hunger strike. The main reason for the ending of the strike was the realisation that each of the families of the strikers would ask for medical intervention whenever the strikers lapsed into unconsciousness. On 6 October 1981 James Prior, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announced a series of measures which went a long way to meeting many aspects of the prisoners' five demands.

The hunger strike of 1981 had very important and far-reaching consequences for Northern Ireland and proved to be one of the key turning points of “the troubles”. The Republican movement had achieved a huge propaganda victory over the British government and had obtained a lot of international sympathy. Active and tacit support for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) increased in Nationalist areas. Political support for Sinn Féin (SF) was demonstrated in two by-elections (and the general election in the Republic of Ireland) and eventually led to the emergence of SF as a significant political force in Northern Ireland. The British government's fear that SF would overtake the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) as the main representative of the Catholic population of Northern Ireland was a key reason for the government signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) on 15 November 1985.

                                         Conclusions

The pattern of violence changed throughout what were colloquially called the troubles. The inter-communal rioting that characterised the late 1960s was gradually, although not completely, replaced by a triangular low intensity conflict. The protagonists were the British state (represented by its army, locally recruited regiments and a militarised police force), republican paramilitaries (mainly the PIRA, but including smaller violent groups like the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)) and loyalist paramilitaries (the Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)). State responses to the violence sometimes contravened basic human rights. By the mid-1990s, more than 3500 people had been killed, a significant number given Northern Ireland’s small area and 1.6 million population [19, p. 34].

                                      Chapter 3 Peace Process

The Irish peace process is the term used to describe the series of attempts to achieve an end to the civil conflict and a political settlement for the differences that divide the community in Northern Ireland.

There is no general agreement among commentators on the start date of the peace process. The announcement of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) "cessation" of military action on 31 August 1994 was the end of one part of the process and the beginning of another phase. Some people consider that the process dates back to the 11 January 1988. This is the date on which John Hume, then leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), had a meeting with Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn Féin (SF). This was the first in a series of discussions that were to take place between the two men from 1988 to 1993. However, the first series of talks broke down and were not resumed until 1993. These new talks eventually lead in 1993 to something called the Hume/Adams initiative based on a document which was agreed by the two leaders. Elements of this document were to find their way into the Downing Street Declaration made jointly by the British and Irish governments.

                  3.1 Early Attempt: Anglo-Irish Agreement

The Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland at Hillsborough, Co. Down on 15 November 1985. The Agreement was the most important development in Anglo-Irish relations since the 1920s. Both Governments confirmed that there would be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of its citizens. Both Governments also viewed the Agreement as a means of inducing unionist leaders in Northern Ireland to accept a devolved power-sharing arrangement.

The Irish Government, through the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference and Maryfield Secretariat, was provided with a consultative role in the administration of Northern Ireland for the first time. It was this consultative role, accompanied by the continuing conditional nature of the British claim to Northern Ireland, that caused strong opposition to the Agreement from the unionist population of Northern Ireland. Republicans also opposed the Agreement as falling short of their demands for immediate British withdrawal and a united Ireland.

The primary objective of the Agreement was to foster peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. With regard to this objective, the Agreement has failed. The two communities in Northern Ireland are as polarised in the 1990s as they ever have been. However, in terms of co-operation between the Irish and British Governments in relation to security and legal affairs, cross-border co-operation, and political matters, the Agreement has had some success. The desire to head off the rise of Sinn Féin (SF) and isolate the Irish Republican Army (IRA) also succeeded, at least in the short-term.

The Irish Government has also provided a voice for the nationalist minority in how Northern Ireland is governed. Most importantly, the Agreement has institutionalised Anglo-Irish relations. The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference has provided a vital channel of communication between the two sovereign powers that has produced increased understanding and promoted a bi-partisan approach to the Northern Ireland conflict.

                            3.2 Paramilitary Ceasefires

On 31 August 1994 the IRA declared “a complete cessation of military operations”, the main loyalist paramilitary organisations following their example in October. The British government shared the unionist suspicions of the IRA ceasefire and ruled out face-to-face talks with Sinn Féin until the permanency of the ceasefire could be established. Nevertheless the British and Irish governments moved to establish the conceptual framework for any political negotiations through the publication of the Frameworks for the Future document. The document stressed that the two governments wanted to see a “comprehensive settlement” that would return greater “power, authority and responsibility to all the Northern Ireland people”. It also reaffirmed the three stranded approach and outlined, in detail, the issues that could be discussed in each strand.

The Frameworks document marked the limit of early progress. The slim majority held by the British Prime Minister, John Major, removed momentum from the peace process. In March 1995 the Secretary of State, Sir Patrick Mayhew, elevated British demands for arms decommissioning into a formal precondition for Sinn Féin’s entry into talks. Sinn Féin regarded decommissioning as a diversion designed to mask an underlying British reluctance to enter into negotiations with them. In late November the governments announced a new approach to the impasse. Under a “twin-track” scheme, an independent decommissioning body, chaired by former US Senate Majority leader George Mitchell, was set up to consider options for paramilitary disarmament while, in parallel, multi-party talks would commence. The International Body on Arms Decommissioning published its report on 24 January 1996. The Mitchell Report’s key recommendation that arms decommissioning and all-party talks should begin in parallel was turned down. In February the IRA called off its ceasefire by detonating a massive bomb in London’s Canary Wharf. It accused John Major and unionists of “squandering this unprecedented opportunity to resolve the conflict” [6, p. 33].

The collapse of the ceasefire did not mean an end to the peace process, although Sinn Féin was barred from the talks on 10 June. Nevertheless talks started between nine other political parties and the two governments. The negotiations rapidly became bogged down on procedural issues, particularly over the appointment of George Mitchell as chair. They were suspended in early July 1996 when tension and violence associated with a contentious Orange Order parade at Drumcree near Portadown spread across Northern Ireland. In July 1996 an independent review body was established to recommend how the parading issue could be handled in the future.

                                           3.3 Belfast Agreement

In May 1997 the Labour Party leader Tony Blair took power with a massive parliamentary majority. He quickly set about drawing Sinn Féin into the political process. By mid-June, the demand for decommissioning prior to Sinn Féin’s entry into talks was dropped. The IRA declared another ceasefire on 20 July 1997, and Sinn Féin entered the talks on 9 September. Throughout the negotiations Unionists refused to engage directly with Sinn Féin, converting them into Dayton-like proximity talks. Reports of splits and dissension within both the IRA and Sinn Féin underlined growing nervousness among republicans. There was also dissatisfaction within David Trimble’s UUP. Four of the its ten MPs made a public call for the party to leave the talks.

In April the chairman of the talks, George Mitchell, set a target date of 9 April for an agreement in order to facilitate a referendum in May. In late March the negotiations intensified, although many issues were still outstanding. The UUP and SDLP held differing views of how power would be shared between both communities in Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin was deeply uneasy at the prospect of any new Northern Ireland assembly and contributed little to negotiations on this matter. The UUP was concerned the remit of cross-border bodies and their relationship with the Northern Ireland Assembly and Irish Parliament, and anxious to tie the Irish government down on the proposed changes to its constitutional claim on Northern Ireland’s territory.

A copy of the Good Friday Agreement was delivered to every home in Northern Ireland in April 1998. It had five main constitutional provisions. First, Northern Ireland’s future constitutional status was to be in the hands of its citizens. Second, if the people of Ireland, north and south, wanted a united Ireland, they could have one by voting for it. Third, Northern Ireland’s current constitutional position would remain within the United Kingdom. Fourth, Northern Ireland’s citizens would have the right to “identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both”. Fifth, the Irish state would drop its territorial claim on Northern Ireland and instead define the Irish nation in terms of people rather than land. The consent principle would be built into the Irish constitution.

Three new interlocking institutions were set up. Relations within Northern Ireland were to be addressed by a power-sharing assembly that would operate on an inclusive basis. All of the main parties would be members of a permanent coalition government. Key decisions would be taken on a cross-community basis. Relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were to be dealt with through the creation of a North-South Ministerial Council which would allow co-operation between the Northern Ireland Assembly and Irish Parliament on certain functional issues. As a safeguard, the Northern Ireland Assembly could only operate if the North-South Ministerial Council was also functioning. Under Strand Three, a British-Irish Council was to be established. This would draw members from the British and Irish governments, as well as the devolved parliament in Scotland and assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland.

                                            Conclusions

The troubles were brought to an uneasy end by a peace process. It included the declaration of ceasefires by most paramilitary organisations, the complete decommissioning of the IRA's weapons, the reform of the police, and the corresponding withdrawal of army troops from the streets and sensitive border areas such as South Armagh and Fermanagh, as agreed by the signatories to the Belfast Agreement (commonly known as the "Good Friday Agreement"). The agreement reiterated the long-held British position, which successive Irish governments had not fully acknowledged, that Northern Ireland would remain within the United Kingdom until a majority votes otherwise.                                                         On the other hand, the British Government recognised for the first time the principle that the people of the island of Ireland as a whole have the right, without any outside interference, to solve the issues between North and South by mutual consent. The latter statement was key to winning support for the agreement from nationalists and republicans. It also established a devolved power-sharing government within Northern Ireland (which had been suspended from 14 October 2002 until 8 May 2007), where the government must consist of both unionist and nationalist parties.

Though the number of active participants in the troubles was relatively small, and the paramilitary organisations that claimed to represent the communities were unrepresentative of the general population, the troubles touched the lives of many people in Northern Ireland on a daily basis, while occasionally spreading to the Republic of Ireland and England.

                                                     Conclusion

Summing it up, it should be said, that the troubles, as they are known to the populace, did not erupt on any specific date, but emerged as the result of several years of escalating incidents between Catholics and Protestants. This latest episode of the long-standing conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland has been going on for thirty years, and although a peace agreement has been reached, a peaceful resolution to this costly struggle is not yet in sight. The troubles have been protracted and costly in every sense of the word. From the time of the first civil rights marches in 1968 the cost, in both human and material terms, has been steadily mounting. Between 1968 and 1994, over 3,500 people died and over 35,000 were injured in Northern Ireland as a direct result of the fighting. Robberies, bombings, assassinations, and terror tactics spread to engulf Great Britain and the Irish Republic, greatly decreasing the common person's sense of security and impinging on the populace's personal freedom. Civil rights in Northern Ireland have been seriously eroded, and freedom in the name of safety has been sacrificed to some extent in both Great Britain and the Irish Republic.

Thus, the main aim in the present course paper, which is to analyze the peculiarities of the troubles that broke out in Northern Ireland in 1969, can be considered achieved.

The theoretical basis of the course paper was formed by the material of the Internet sources, encyclopedias and educational supplies.            

The undertaken research resulted in the following conclusions:                           

1. In addition to the violence and intimidation, Northern Ireland conflict brought about chronic unemployment and a severe housing shortage. Vandalism was also a major problem. In the 1970s there were 10,000 vandalised empty houses in Belfast alone.

2. Social intercourse was affected. Normal interaction and friendship with people from the opposite side of the religious/political divide was nearly impossible in the atmosphere of fear and distrust that the troubles generated.

3. The economy, struggling to keep pace with the restructuring of the British economy in the 1970s and 1980s, was further battered by a backdrop of political violence.

Above all the troubles were a human crisis with thousands of individual, family and community tragedies.

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