Теории, представленные в этой главе, показывают сложную  природу «проблематики ПИИ» которая  требует скрупулезной бизнес-разведки, информационных и промоутерских механизмов. Для налаживания прямых контактов с иностранными инвесторами ответственные власти должны наделить независимый департамент или агентство необходимыми полномочиями в сфере ПИИ. Этому агентству необходимо быстро заслужить доверие и получить легитимность посредством связей с высшими исполнительными и законодательными органами. В переходной экономике неэффективен раздел ответственности в сфере ПИИ среди различных министерских департаментов. Для укрепления ПИИ-позиции России и скорейшего промышленного возрождения необходима концентрация власти.

В динамичном глобальном контексте, определяемом интенсивной  конкуренцией и экономической интеграцией между странами, необходимо проведение регулярного сбора данных и мониторинга вне зависимости от выбранной Россией ПИИ-стратегии Основные ПИИ-теории должны мотивировать принятие политических решений - касающихся глобальных перспектив привлечения ПИИ и мировой конкуренции - лишь на основе реальных фактов и реалистичных прогнозов.

 

Далее из книги Fischer Paul  Foreign direct investment in Russia. Strategy for Industrial Recovery. Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000 

Table 1. OLI variables according to Dunning

A. Ownership-specific advantages (0-advantages)

(represent assets vis-a- vis major competitors)

•  Size of company and established position in domestic and international markets

• Management and leadership skills

• Product know-how

•  Process technologies, engineering skills, R&D capacity

•  Monopoly/oligopoly power, allowing exclusive or favoured access to inputs, e.g. labour, natural resources

• Trade marks

• Organizational, marketing systems

B. Internalization-specific advantages (Ladvantages)

(protect against market failure and enable control of assets»

I-advantages can be developed:

• where there is buyer uncertainty about the nature and value of products and technologies being sold

• where the market does not permit price discrimination

•  where there is a need for the seller to protect product quality

I-advantages enable:

•  a reduction in costs related to market research, negotiations and monitoring

• the capture of economies of scale and interdependent activities

• compensation for absence of future market

•  the avoidance or exploitation of government-related barriers (e.g. quotas, tariffs, price controls, tax differences)

• the control of supplies and conditions of sale of inputs including technology)

•  the control of market outlets (including those that might be used by competitors)

• engagement in cross-subsidization and internal pricing strategies so that profits arc shitted to low-tax environments

C. Location-specific advantages (L-advantages)

(may favour home or host countries)

• Spatial distribution of inputs and markets

• Competitive input prices: labour, energy, raw materials, components, transport and communications

•  Political stability, balance of power

•  Liberal policies; low tariffs, favourable tax rates, FDI incentives, good climate for investment

•  Reliable legal system

•  Developed physical infrastructure: roads, railways, airports, ports, telecommunications

•  Sociocultural proximity: language, history, mentality, business practices

•  Long-term market potential and size (possible economies of scale)

Source: Adapted from Dunning (1981, 1992).

 

Table 2. Main features of the five stages in a country's N0I position

 

 

The investment development path of nations

  The eclectic paradigm also helps understand how countries move ahead on the investment development path from their initial position as exclusive recipients to their subsequent position as originators of FDI.

             The notion of the investment development path (IDP) implies that the outward and inward FDI position of a country is directly related to the level of its economic development in relation to the rest of the world. The basic elements of the theory were formulated by Dunning in 1981; they were further refined and extended in cooperation with Narula from Limburg University, the Netherlands (1994). The IDP paradigm suggests that countries pass through five main stages of development (Table 2), and they can be classified according to their propensity to be inward and/or outward direct investors. The paradigm illustrates the net outward investment (N0I) position of a country, which is defined as the difference between inward and outward FDI stock. A positive N0I position means that the country has become a net outward investor, and vice versa in the case of a negative N01 position. In line with Dunning's eclectic paradigm, a country's propensity to attract or not to attract FDI rests on three types of advantages related to ownership, location and internalization.

The IDP suggests that companies tend to invest in markets with lower per capita GDP than their home countries, at least until they reach the fifth stage. A positive net outward FDI position offers a measure of the transfer of created assets to lower-income countries; it is compatible with the technological advantage in the home country of the investing TNC. This measure must be confronted with other types of FDI such as market-seeking FDI or strategic asset-acquiring FDI (mergers and acquisitions). There is, however, no absolute tendency to always invest downstream in lower-cost countries. Besides, a wide variation of net ownership   advantages can exist across industries leading to investments in countries with higher per capita GDP by TNCs from countries in stages 2 and 3 (e.g. Tata from India in the United States, United Kingdom, and Singapore;       Salim from Indonesia in the United States, Europe and Japan; Hyundai from South Korea in Canada).

 

Examples:

Stage 1: Bulgaria, Russia, Vietnam

Stage 2: Hungary, India, Indonesia, Poland

Stage 3: Brazil, China, Mexico

Stage 4: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, United States

Stage 5: Canada

Source: Adapted from J. H. Dunning 'The Investment Development Path Revisited', in Foreign Direct Investment and Governments. Catalysts for Economic Restructuring, 1996,p.2.

 

Per capita GDP is not the only determinant of a country's FDI position. Net outward investment per capita is likely to be higher in countries that depend on 'created' assets (e.g. know-how, technologies, management) for their prosperity than in countries where natural resources abound (e.g. China vs Singapore, Russia vs Hungary). Government measures may also stimulate or restrict the level of either inward or outward investment and can significantly alter a country's net outward FDI position.

  The FDI position of a country is also conditioned by its general economic performance, particularly the stage of development of its industries, which reflects its endowment of labour, capital and other resources. Countries where labour-intensive, low-skill manufacturing or natural resource extraction prevails are mostly net FDI importers. As they move on to capital-intensive industrial activities, domestic companies gain financial strength and start undertaking investments abroad (stages 2 and 3 on the IDP). The Chinese and Indian economics reached that stage on the IDP during the early 1990s.⁴² The net FDI position starts improving further with the expansion of more advanced high-tech and knowledge-intensive goods and services, especially if there is a clear policy of TNC-facilitated industrial upgrading that allows a country to move on to stage 4 of the IDP (e.g. France, Germany).

 Russia is in a somewhat paradoxical situation. Since economic transformation started many years ago, the country has not been able to attract volumes of FDI commensurate with its size and potential resources. On the other hand, if official statistics can be taken at face value, Russia has built up the strongest outward FDI position among European transition countries. Outward FDI corresponds to about one-third of inbound FDI and is growing, while inbound FDI is still stagnating.⁴⁵ This fact places the country at stage 3 of the IDP. Although low inbound volumes mainly reflect the lack of a coherent FDI policy and the still unclear legal conditions for foreign investors, the Russian case shows that intermediary positions and even jumps on the IDP are possible, and that the theory cannot claim to be a foolproof recipe for economic development with the support of FDI.

            However, the theory postulates that countries at stages 2 and 3 first experience increases in inward and then in outward FDI, which is hardly the case for Russia in 1999. If Russian authorities will make all the necessary efforts in the coming years to attract more FDI, then much higher inbound than outbound flows are to be expected. The theory would thus regain its full validity, placing Russia at the very beginning of stage 2 of the IDP, which would be in line with the country's overall level of  current economic and industrial development. In fact, if abstraction is made of current outbound flows, Russia would currently be somewhere at stage 1 of the IDP, i.e. at the beginning of a long process of massive inbound FD1. It should be the aim of the Russian government to fuel industrial development through an adequate FDI policy so that stage 3 can be reached during 2005-10. This would demonstrate a certain ability of Russian enterprises to compete in world markets.

Policy implications of major FDI theories

             FDI theories elaborated by leading scholars attempt to find plausible explanations for the motivations of cross-border investment activities ofTNCs and ways of economic advancement of countries through FDI. They include findings that can offer policy-makers valuable tools for increasing FDI by anticipating TNC behaviour, acting on fundamental decision-making variables at corporate level, and monitoring the FDI position of a national economy with respect to competitor nations. Some of the policy implications of the different theories are summarized in 'Fable 1.6. FDI theories can provide significant guidelines for policy-making at the highest level, provided the assumptions underlying a specific theory are adapted to the local Russian context. The findings of a few selected theories can assist policy-makers in optimizing the entire FDI enhancement process, from strategic planning to the analysis phase and implementation, including the use of appropriate policy instruments and efficiency control. FDI specialists can thus be motivated to positively influence potential investors so that the desired investment can be solicited.

 The theories presented in this chapter already demonstrate the complex nature of the 'FDI issue', which demands state-of-the-art intelligence, information and promotion mechanisms. To approach foreign investors effectively, the authorities will need to bestow an independent body or agencv with the needed executive and advisory powers in the field of FDI.⁴⁴ The agency needs to become credible quickly and therefore must enjoy the highest possible political legitimation by liaising with the top level of the Russian executive and legislative. In a transition economy, it would be ineffective to split FDl-related issues among several ministerial departments. Strong coordinating powers are required to rectify Russia's foreign investment situation and to achieve speedy industrial upgrading.

 Independently of the definitive FDI strategy adopted by the Russian leadership, regular monitoring and intelligence operations are indispensable in a dynamic world marked by intense competition and growing economic integration among nations. Major FDI theories provide a valuable incentive so that political decisions are based on actual facts and realistic projections with respect to global opportunities and competition.

 

Table 3   Policy implications of major FDI theories