Staff Report to the Commission

his own money in support of the hijackers, to be reimbursed by KSM. As a result, he could not be sure

exactly where he got every dollar he spent.

148 Ali’s bank records show his accounts never contained sufficient funds to account for the money he sent

to the United States, lending credence to his claim he kept the money in a laundry bag at home.

149. The person who received the funds came forward shortly after 9/11 to explain that he may have

unwittingly aided two men who turned out to be hijackers. The FBI interviewed him extensively and

satisfied itself that he did not knowingly aid the hijackers.

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transactions using various aliases, he provided enough personal information to enable the

FBI to unravel the aliases after 9/11.150

In any event, aliases were not the key to Ali’s security. Instead, he relied on the

anonymity provided by bustling financial center of Dubai and the vast international

monetary system. His employment as computer wholesaler provided perfect cover. Ali

said he sent the final $70,000 in one large transfer because Shehhi had called and asked

him to “send him everything.” According to Ali, KSM was displeased when he later

learned of the transfer because he thought the size of the transaction would alert the

security services. The amount did not worry Ali, however, because he knew that Dubai

computer companies frequently transferred such amounts of money. Ali said he

experienced no problem with this transfer, or any transfer in aid of the hijackers.151

Binalshibh also played a role in financing the plot by wiring, in four transfers, more than

$10,000 from Germany to the United States. On June 13, 2000, Binalshibh sent

$2,708.33 from Hamburg to Shehhi in New York via a Traveler’s Express/Moneygram

transfer. On June 21, 2000, he sent $1,803.19 from Hamburg to Shehhi in New York by

the same means. Binalshibh also sent two Western Union transfers from Hamburg to

Shehhi in Florida, wiring $1,760.15 and $4,118.14 on July 25 and September 25, 2000,

respectively. Binalshibh apparently funded these transfers by withdrawing money from

Shehhi’s account at Dresdner Bank.

In addition, Binalshibh, using an alias, sent $14,000, in two installments, to Zacarias

Moussaoui in early August 2001. Binalshibh received the money for these transfers from

Hawsawi, wired in two installments on July 30 and July 31.152

As it turned out, none of the wire transfers associated with the plot—from Dubai or

Germany—raised any significant suspicion or concern. They were essentially invisible in

the billions of dollars in wire transfers that take place every day throughout the world.

Physical importation of cash and traveler’s checks

The hijackers also brought into the United States a substantial amount of cash and

traveler’s checks, beginning with the first hijackers to come to the United States, Mihdhar

and Hazmi. Following their January 15, 2000, arrival in Los Angeles, they opened an

account at Bank of America in San Diego with a $9,900 deposit on February 4, 2000.

They likely brought in more cash they deposited, as they surely had to pay for goods and

services in the period between their arrival in Los Angeles and the opening of their Bank

150 The FBI effort was made possible by unprecedented cooperation from the UAE, which provided copies

of the paperwork Ali used and allowed the FBI to interview witnesses. Later Ali confirmed he sent the wire

transfers.

151 Central Banker Sultan bin Nasser al-Suweidi was quoted in the press earlier this year as contending that

the UAE reported to U.S. officials Ali’s large wire transfer to Al-Shehhi a year before 9/11. See Associated

Press, Dubai Banks Remain Focus of Terror Funding Investigation (Jan. 17, 2004) (printed from

WSJ.Com, 2/5/05). We have found no evidence the UAE provided any such notification. We have been

told Al-Suweidi later backed off the statement in discussions with the FBI.

152 Binalshibh and Al-Hawsawi both used aliases for these transactions.

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of America account in San Diego, roughly three weeks later. The $16,000 that KSM said

he gave Hazmi to support his and Mihdhar’s travel and living expenses in the United

States is the likely source of their funds.153

Shehhi apparently also brought some cash into the United States. He purchased $2,000 in

traveler’s checks from a New York bank on May 31, 2000, two days after his arrival in

New Jersey. He had apparently withdrawn these funds from his Dresdner Bank account

before he left Germany. Similarly, on June 28, two days after arriving in the United

States, Jarrah opened an account at a bank in Venice, Florida, with a $2,000 cash deposit,

apparently funds he had brought into the country.

The 13 muscle hijackers who arrived in the United States between April 23 and June 29,

2001, brought with them cash or traveler’s checks for their own expenses and to replenish

the funds of the hijackers who had previously arrived. These funds seem to have been

provided directly to the muscle hijackers by plot leader KSM when he met with them in

Pakistan before they transited the UAE en route to the United States, although their

Dubai facilitators may have provided some additional funding.154 Ali recalled that the

hijackers arrived in Dubai with money to purchase plane tickets and traveler’s checks, but

said he may have provided some of them with additional funds. Hawsawi said he spent

approximately $7,000–$9,000 in expenses for the hijackers in the UAE.

Investigation has confirmed that six of the muscle hijackers who arrived in this period

purchased traveler’s checks totaling $43,980 in the UAE and used them in the United

States.155 Beyond these confirmed funds, the muscle hijackers almost surely brought in

more money in cash or traveler’s checks that has not been identified. Some of the newly

arrived muscle made substantial deposits shortly after entering the United States, and

other hijackers made deposits soon after the muscle arrived. For example, Satam al

Suqami and Waleed al Shehri arrived in the United States from the UAE on April 23,

2001, and opened a bank account at SunTrust in Fort Lauderdale on May 1 with a deposit

of $9,000. It appears likely that Suqami or Shehri brought in cash or purchased traveler’s

checks in the UAE, although such a purchase has not been identified. Similarly, on June

1, 2001, $3,000 was deposited into Jarrah’s SunTrust account and $8,000 was deposited

into the Shehhi/Atta joint account. These funds may have been cash or traveler’s checks

that investigation has not yet identified, purchased and brought into the United States by

153

There has been substantial speculation that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi received the money in Thailand in

January 2000, where they traveled with senior Al-Qaeda operative Khallad bin Attash, and where we know

Khallad received funds from another al Qaeda operative. It now seems unlikely that the hijackers received

funds from Khallad in Thailand in light of KSM’s account of providing them with funds and Khallad’s own

account in which he explained Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi made a spur of the moment decision to go to

Bangkok with him after their initial meeting in Malaysia, largely to obtain Thai stamps on their passport,

which they hoped would help ease their entry in the United States by making them appear more like

tourists. Other evidence corroborates Khallad’s account, and it seems more likely the hijackers received

operational funds from KSM in Pakistan, as he described, than on a trip they decided to make on the spur

of the moment.

154 As noted above, KSM said he gave each of the muscle hijackers $10,000 to facilitate their travel to the

United States.)

155 5 The FBI has confirmed purchases by Majed Moqed, Wail Al-Shehri, Ahmed Al-Haznawi, Saeed Al-

Ghamdi, Hamza Al-Ghamdi, Ahmed Al-Nami.

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one or more of the three additional muscle hijackers—Hamza al Ghamdi, Ahmed al

Nami, or Mohand al Shehri—who had entered the United States on May 28, 2001.156

Plot facilitators Ali and Hawsawi provided logistical assistance to the muscle hijackers as

they transited the UAE en route to the United States, including assistance in purchasing

plane tickets and traveler’s checks. Phone records indicate that Ali aided the hijackers

through May 2001 and that, thereafter, Hawsawi became the primary facilitator. A

notebook Al-Hawsawi maintained shows payments he made to or on behalf hijackers

transiting the UAE in June.

Ali has confirmed his role in assisting the muscle hijackers while they were in the UAE.

KSM provided them with Ali’s phone number, and they called him upon their arrival. He

assisted them in purchasing airline tickets, traveler’s checks, and Western-style clothes;

arranged hotels and food; and also taught them Western skills, such as ordering at fastfood

restaurants. It is not clear why Hawsawi got involved in the plot. Ali said he

requested that KSM send someone to Dubai to assist him with the transiting operatives

because he feared the time required to support the hijackers and train them to adapt to

Western life would impinge on his day job with the computer company. According to

Ali, KSM then directed Hawsawi to help him; but by the time Hawsawi arrived, Ali

discovered the hijackers were not staying very long in Dubai and did not demand much

of his time. It is hard to imagine that Ali was so concerned about his day job, but no other

reason for Hawsawi’s involvement is readily apparent.

Hawsawi has acknowledged aiding some of the muscle hijackers in the UAE. In addition,

he assisted and provided funds to Mohamed al Kahtani, who was selected as a hijacker

and flew to Orlando before being denied access to the United States. Kahtani had $2,800

cash in his possession when he arrived at the airport in Florida.

The hijackers who traveled internationally after arriving in the United States also carried

funds back with them. For example, Mihdhar purchased $4,900 in traveler’s checks in

Saudi Arabia shortly before he returned to the United States on July 4, 2001, after an

extended absence. According to Hawsawi’s notebook, Hawsawi gave the funds to

Mihdhar in the UAE in June 2001 to buy these checks. In some instances, we cannot

determine whether the hijackers brought in more cash from overseas travel. For example,

in the weeks after Shehhi returned to Florida from a trip to Egypt on May 2, 2001, several

large deposits were made into his SunTrust account ($8,600 on May 11 and $3,400 on

May 22). It is unclear whether the deposits came from funds Shehhi received overseas,

funds brought by the muscle hijackers arriving in late May, or funds previously

withdrawn and not spent.

Zacarias Moussaoui brought more money into the United States than any other person

associated with the 9/11 attacks. Moussaoui declared $35,000 to Customs when he

arrived in the United States from London on February 23, 2001, and he deposited

$32,000 into a Norman, Oklahoma, bank three days later.

156. Some hijackers declared funds when they entered the U.S., but others, who we know had funds with

them, did not.

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Accessing overseas accounts

The hijackers also financed their activities in the United States by accessing funds

deposited into overseas accounts. There are two primary examples of this method. Hani

Hanjour maintained accounts at the Saudi British Bank in Saudi Arabia and at Citibank in

the UAE. While in the United States, he accessed his foreign accounts through an ATM

card to finance his activities. Approximately $9,600 was deposited into the Saudi British

Bank account, and $8,000 into the Citibank account. Ali said he provided Hanjour with

$3,000 to open the Citibank account and deposited another $5,000 into that account while

Hanjour was in the United States.157

One of the muscle hijackers, Fayez Banihammad, also set up an overseas account to

provide funding in the United States. On June 25, 2001, with the aid of Hawsawi,

Banihammad opened two accounts at the Standard Chartered Bank in the UAE and

deposited about $30,000 in UAE dirhams. According to Hawsawi, Banihammad brought

the funds with him to open the accounts when he came to the UAE. Hawsawi was given

power of attorney over the accounts on July 18, 2001. The accounts were accessible by

an ATM card and a Visa card. Hawsawi received the Visa card from the bank after

Banihammad departed for the United States and apparently sent it to Banihammad in the

United States by express delivery. After his arrival in the United States on June 27,

Banihammad made cash withdrawals with both cards to help fund the plot in the United

States, and he used the Visa card to purchase the 9/11 plane tickets for himself and one of

the muscle hijackers and to pay his Boston hotel bill on the morning of 9/11. Hawsawi

apparently bolstered Banihammad’s financing with a deposit of $4,900 on August 20,

2001, into Banihammad’s SCB account.

No aid from U.S. persons

No credible evidence exists that the hijackers received any substantial funding from any

person in the United States. With one possible minor exception discussed below, the

FBI’s investigation has not revealed any evidence that any person in the United States

knowingly provided any funding to the hijackers. Extensive investigation by Commission

staff has revealed nothing to the contrary.

Despite persistent public speculation, there is no evidence that the hijackers who initially

settled in San Diego, Mihdhar and Hazmi, received funding from Saudi citizens Omar al

Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan, or that Saudi Princess Haifa al Faisal provided any funds

to the hijackers either directly or indirectly. A number of internal FBI documents state

without reservation that Bayoumi paid rent on behalf of Mihdhar and Hazmi, a claim

reflecting the initial view of some FBI agents. More thorough investigation, however, has

determined that Bayoumi did not pay rent or provide any funding to the hijackers. On one

157 Hanjour also received $900 from his brother, who is not believed to be a witting supporter of the plot.

The origin of the rest of the funds is unclear, although Hanjour may have received funds when he transited

Pakistan in June 2000.

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139

occasion he did obtain a cashier’s check to assist Mihdhar and Hazmi pay a security

deposit and first month’s rent, but the hijackers immediately reimbursed him from their

funds.

The one person who evidence indicates may have provided money to a hijacker in the

United States was Yazeed al Salmi, a Saudi citizen who came to the United States on a

student visa in August 2000; he settled in San Diego, where he came into contact with

future hijacker Nawaf al Hazmi. On September 5, 2000, $1,900 was deposited into

Hazmi’s San Diego Bank of America account from a set of $4,000 in traveler’s checks

that Salmi had purchased in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on July 16, 2000. Little more is

known about this transaction. After September 11, Salmi was detained as a material

witness because of his contact with Hazmi, and was debriefed extensively by the FBI. He

even testified to the grand jury before being deported to Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, the

FBI did not learn that Salmi’s traveler’s checks wound up in Hazmi’s account until after

he was deported, and Salmi never informed his interrogators of the matter. In June 2004,

Salmi was interviewed regarding the transaction, and claimed not to recall it. There are

no other known witnesses to this transaction.

Did Salmi fund Hazmi, knowingly or otherwise? It appears likely that Hazmi did nothing

more than facilitate a transaction for Salmi. Indeed, Hazmi’s bank records reveal that he

withdrew $1,900 in cash the same day he deposited the $1,900 in traveler’s checks. This

large withdrawal is unusual for Hazmi, as he tended to make much smaller cash

withdrawals or use his debit card. Moreover, Salmi did not yet have a bank account in the

United States at the time of the transaction, so it is entirely possible that he simply asked

Hazmi to do him the favor of cashing the traveler’s checks for him.158

There is no evidence that Salmi ever provided Hazmi with any other funds. Neither

Salmi’s account at Bank of America nor Hazmi’s account there reflects any other

transfers or indicia of transfers. There is no evidence that any other person in San Diego

provided Hazmi or any other hijacker with any funds.159

No hawalas, self-funding, or state support

The extensive investigation into the financing of the 9/11 plot has revealed no evidence to

suggest that the hijackers used hawala or any other informal value transfer mechanism to

send money to the United States. Moreover, KSM and the other surviving plot

participants have either not mentioned hawalas or explicitly denied they were used. Wire

transfers, physical importation of funds, and access of foreign bank accounts were

sufficient to support the hijackers; there seems to be no reason al Qaeda would have used

158 Al-Salmi opened an account at Bank of America on September 11, 2000, according to the account

opening document.

159 In September 2000, Al-Hazmi assisted another San Diego associate with a transaction by writing a

check on his behalf. Thus, the associate provided Al-Hazmi with $3000, and Al-Hazmi immediately wrote

a check for that amount on behalf of the associate. The transaction was a wash, which resulted in no

funding of Al-Hazmi.

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hawalas as well. Although al Qaeda frequently used hawalas to transfer funds from the

Gulf area to Pakistan and Afghanistan, we have not seen any evidence that al Qaeda

employed them in moving money to or from the United States.160

The hijackers were apparently not expected to provide their own financing once they

arrived in the United States. There is no evidence that any of them held jobs in the United

States, with the exception of Nawaf al Hazmi, who worked part-time in a gas station for

about a month, earning $6 an hour. As discussed above, Shehhi received a salary from the

UAE military though December 23, 2000, but did not do any work for this money. There

is no evidence to suggest that any of the hijackers engaged in any type of criminal

activity to support themselves. Finally, there no evidence that any government funded the

9/11 plot in whole or part.

Hijackers use of U.S. banks

While in the United States, the hijackers made extensive use of U.S. banks. They chose

branches of major international banks, such as Bank of America and SunTrust, and

smaller regional banks, such as the Hudson United Bank and Dime Savings Bank in New

Jersey. Plot leaders Atta and Shehhi may have chosen SunTrust because their Florida

flight school banked there and directed its students to use it as well. The muscle hijackers

who later linked up with Atta and Shehhi also opened accounts at SunTrust. There is no

information available as to how or why the hijackers chose other banks. The hijackers

typically opened checking accounts and Visa debit card accounts at the same time.

All of the hijackers opened accounts in their own name, using passports and other

identification documents. Contrary to numerous published reports, there is no evidence

the hijackers ever used false Social Security numbers to open any bank accounts. In some

cases, a bank employee completed the Social Security number field on the new account

application with a hijacker’s date of birth or visa control number, but did so on his or her

own to complete the form. No hijacker presented or stated a false number.

The hijackers were not experts on the use of the U.S. financial system. For example, the

teller who opened the initial Atta-Shehhi joint account at SunTrust in July 2000 said she

spent about an hour with them, explaining the process of wiring money. On one occasion

in June 2001, the hijackers aroused suspicion at a SunTrust branch in Florida while

attempting to cash a check for $2,180. Shehhi presented identification documents with

different addresses, and the bank personnel thought the signature on the check did not

match his signature on file. The bank manager refused to sign the check and issued an

internal alert to other SunTrust branches to watch the account for possible fraud. The

internal alert was a routine notice sent in accordance with SunTrust’s loss avoidance

procedures. SunTrust never considered reporting Shehhi to the government because it had

no evidence he had done anything illegal. No one at SunTrust or any other financial

institution thought, or had any reason to think, that the hijackers were criminals, let alone

160 See chapter 2 re al Qaeda’s use of hawala, generally.

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terrorists bent on mass murder, and no financial institution had any reason to report their

behavior to the government.

The hijackers’ transactions themselves were not extraordinary or remarkable. The

hijackers generally followed a pattern of occasional large deposits, which they accessed

frequently through relatively small ATM and debit card transactions. They also made

cash withdrawals and some occasionally wrote checks. In short, they used their accounts

just as did many other bank customers. No one monitoring their transactions alone would

have had any basis for concern.

Contrary to persistent media reports, no financial institution filed a Suspicious Activity

Report (SAR) in connection with any transaction of any of the 19 hijackers before 9/11,

although such SARs were filed after 9/11 when their names became public. The failure to

file SARs was not unreasonable. Even in hindsight, there is nothing—including the

SunTrust situation described above—to indicate that any SAR should have been filed or

the hijackers otherwise reported to law enforcement.

Return of funds to al Qaeda

From September 5 through September 10, 2001, the hijackers consolidated their unused

funds and sent them to Hawsawi in the UAE. On September 5, Banihammad wired

$8,000 from his account at SunTrust Bank to his Standard Chartered Bank account in the

UAE. On September 8 through 10, the hijackers sent four Western Union wire transfers

totaling $18,260 to Hawsawi at two different exchange houses in the UAE. In addition,

Hazmi and Mihdhar deposited their excess cash into an account held by Mihdhar at First

Union Bank in New Jersey, bringing the balance to $9,838.31 on September 10. That

same day, Hazmi and Hanjour sent an express mail package containing the debit card

linked to Mihdhar’s First Union account to a P.O. box in the UAE rented by Hawsawi.

After the 9/11 attacks, a receipt for the sending of this package was found in Hazmi’s car

at Dulles International Airport, and the FBI intercepted the package.