Key Facts

Key Facts

• The end of the Cold War led to renewed questioning of the US global role and in particular its

involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions (Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo) and in

nation building. However, there was little real national debate on foreign policy interests and

priorities.

• The US responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by massing a huge military force for “Operation

Desert Storm.” In the wake of a rapid Gulf War victory, President Bush’s optimism about a “new world order’’ was short-lived as the US struggled to deal with conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere.

• President Clinton’s priorities were expanding democracy, free markets, and preparing the US for the challenges of globalization. His emphasis on multilateral institutions should not hide the fact that his administration was also prepared to go it alone on many issues. Republican control of Congress from 1995 onwards made life difficult for Clinton.

• George W. Bush appointed an experienced team to run foreign policy. He began by rejecting many of Clinton’s policies and adopted mainly a unilateralist approach during his first nine months in office. Several international treaties were rejected and “new realism” was proclaimed as the guiding principle.

• The US response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks demonstrated the importance of multilateral cooperation. Bush secured support of a broad international coalition to tackle global terrorism. But there was little sign of wider US interest in multilateralism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

President George H. W. Bush

The end of the Cold War did not lead to any rejoicing in Washington. There were no victory speeches, celebrations, or medals. A certain justified, quiet satisfaction was apparent, but President George H. W. Bush rightly held that there was no need to rub Soviet faces in the mud, particularly as there were many daunting problems to overcome, including the reunification of Germany and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

George H. W. Bush was the last US President to have direct experience of the Second World War. He also came to office with an excellent pedigree in foreign affairs, having been a former envoy to China and the UN as well as director of the CIA (Bush 1999). Despite his considerable experience, Bush did not find it easy to articulate what should be the US role in the post-Cold War world. One of those who did try and set down some guidelines was Francis Fukuyama. In a widely read and highly influential article (later a book), The End of History, Fukuyama postulated that the collapse of  communism meant that liberal democracy had triumphed. Not all states were democratic or had market economies but that was their common goal. This meant the end of history in the sense of searching for the best system and the end of major wars. The Fukuyama thesis was challenged by many, including Samuel Huntington, who predicted that the new fault lines in the world would be cultural and religious leading to a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996). Even if there were to be no more major wars, there were numerous smaller wars that posed difficult choices for the US. One of the problems Bush faced was a reduced budget to buttress his foreign policy efforts. Largely as a result of the massive arms expenditure during the Reagan years (1981–9), the US had moved from being a creditor nation to being the largest debtor nation in the world. As the treasury coffers were empty, albeit not for the Pentagon, Bush could not offer the new emerging democracies in Eastern Europe anything like the Marshall Plan that had benefited Western Europe after 1945. Nearly all

US assistance in the early 1990s was directed to Israel and Egypt plus the small countries of Central America.

The lack of finance was also an important factor in the US response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990. The invasion took the US and the rest of the world by surprise. The Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, had made threatening noises before toward his oil-rich neighbor but nothing had happened. Iraq had also benefited from US weaponry during the 1980s and Saddam Hussein did not believe that the US would go beyond imposing sanctions on his country. President Bush, however, was not prepared to allow such naked aggression to go unpunished, especially as it would irreparably damage any prospect of a “new world order” being established. The President also argued that it was essential to protect America’s vital oil interests in the region. If the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was ignored, then neighboring Saudi Arabia, with a sixth of proven world oil reserves and a main supplier to the US, might be next in line.

Despite these arguments, there were considerable doubts in Congress as to whether the US should respond militarily as Bush wished. Many argued that the imposition of sanctions would be a sufficient response. The decisive vote in the Senate was only 52–47 in favor of using force at that time. Meanwhile, Bush had succeeded not only in securing UN approval for a military response, but also stitched together a coalition that financed the war (especially the large contributions from Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia). Former Secretary of State, James Baker, has described how Bush was keen to ensure that American action had the widest international support in order to disprove the impression that American foreign policy followed “a cowboy mentality” (Baker 1995). With a broad international coalition, including the Soviet Union, supporting the US, the American military, under the leadership of General Norman Schwarzkopf in the field and Colin Powell as chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs, was free to launch a massive attack on the Iraqi forces in February 1991. Within a matter of days, the US military, complete with the latest weaponry and aided by contingents from Britain and France, won an overwhelming victory in “Operation Desert Storm.” Courtesy of CNN and the BBC, millions of television viewers around the world were able to see American cruise missiles strike targets in Baghdad and elsewhere with amazing precision. President Bush decided to end the war when Iraqi forces retreated from Kuwait. This decision was then, and later, widely criticized as it left Saddam Hussein in power and free to persecute the minority Kurds and Shiite groups in Iraq. As a consequence of his defeat, Saddam Hussein had to accept the presence in Iraq of UN inspectors who had a mandate to search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The inspectors faced innumerable problems in carrying out their activities and eventually Saddam Hussein ordered them out of Iraq under the pretence that they were spying. The UN had also imposed a strict sanctions regime on Iraq and a “no-fly zone’’ covering the north and south of Iraq. The sanctions regime did not lead to any weakening of Saddam Hussein’s grip on power but it was blamed for the deaths of many children through malnutrition and lack of medicines. This suffering was used by the Iraqi leader to considerable propaganda effect against the US. The no-fly zone was monitored by the US and British airforces that regularly bombed Iraqi military installations if there was a violation of the zone. This game of “cat and mouse” continued throughout the 1990s. When George W. Bush took office there was a hardening of the US stance toward Iraq with a number of senior officials, led by Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, arguing that this Bush administration should finish what the previous Bush administration had failed to do – topple Saddam Hussein. These arguments increased in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001. The opponents of this policy, led by Secretary of State, Colin Powell, argued that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would be a highly risky operation involving massive American forces operating alone as the international coalition to counter terrorism (with the exception of Britain) had made clear its opposition to any invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, there was no certainty that removing Saddam Hussein would lead to a more stable or democratic Iraq. President Bush, with approval ratings topping 90 percent, was delighted at the military success in the Gulf, believed that the Vietnam syndrome had been buried in the desert sands, and considered that the world was on the verge of a new era. In his State of the Union address in January 1991, the President proclaimed that there was the very real prospect of a new world order in which the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong…a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations…a world in which the United Nations – freed from Cold War stalemate – is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders.

Bush rejected the idea that the US should become the world’s policeman but in the wake of the Cold War, “as the only remaining superpower, it is our responsibility – it is our opportunity – to lead.” This vision of a “new world order” had echoes of Wilsonian idealism but Bush did not maintain his grandiose rhetoric for long. His administration was faced with numerous pressing problems including the break up of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany (a task it managed with considerable skill), a humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia, and the tragedy of Yugoslavia. The break-up of the Soviet Union was a major headache for the US as there were around 30,000 nuclear weapons spread around the constituent republics of the former communist superpower. It became a top priority to ensure that these weapons remained under safe control. Washington helped Moscow financially to secure the return of these weapons to Russian territory and their eventual destruction.

Despite having won a spectacular victory in the Gulf War that demonstrated US military dominance, Bush was reluctant to become involved in the Balkans. 1992 was an election year and Bush, already under attack by his Democratic rival, Bill Clinton, for spending too much time on foreign policy, was not willing to commit American troops in a precarious situation. In a reference to the Yugoslav conflict, James Baker, his Secretary of State, said that the US “did not have a dog in that fight” and despite protests from some members of the administration, Washington refused to get involved in the early years of the conflict (Zimmerman 1996). Apart from the lack of an agreed policy on the Balkans, the US was also afraid of taking any action that might have a negative impact on Mikhail Gorbachev’s chances of survival. Although Bush was slow in coming to trust Gorbachev, his later support for the Soviet leader dwarfed all other foreign policy considerations including support for Ukrainian independence and readiness to intervene in Yugoslavia (Halberstam 2001). The refusal to become involved in the Balkans led some observers to suggest that the US was guilty of double standards. It was ready to act quickly and decisively when its oil interests were threatened, but not otherwise. Others criticized the new US formula for warfare that required massive firepower, followed by a speedy withdrawal from the scene of destruction, regardless of the havoc and anarchy that followed (Ambrose and Brinkley 1997:377–8). In dealing with the reunification of Germany, Bush displayed a sure touch. He quickly recognized the geopolitical importance of securing a united, democratic Germany in the center of Europe, and ensured that the US was in the driving seat of the four-power (US, Soviet Union, Britain and France) negotiations that dealt with German reunification. He dealt firmly with Soviet attempts to weaken the new German state, rejecting the idea that it should be neutral and not fully in NATO. He also dealt firmly with a highly skeptical British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and a reluctant French President, Francois Mitterrand, both of whom would have preferred to slow down and even postpone German reunification (Rice and Zelikow 1997).

The sudden collapse of communism and the swift success of “Operation Desert Storm” raised a number of questions about America’s post-Cold War role. Would the US be willing to continue playing the role of world cop or sheriff? If so, would it continue to adopt a selective approach? What should be the criteria for intervention? Who would foot the bill? Surprisingly, there was little real debate among the foreign and security policy elite as to what role the US should play and whether the massive resources devoted to external affairs should be reduced. In 1991–2, Bush, supported by a powerful coalition of entrenched bureaucratic interests, arms producers and a Congress reluctant to accept military base closures, rejected calls for a substantial cut in the defense budget. Indeed the Pentagon, in a famous leaked report of 1992 entitled Defense Policy Guidelines argued that the US should do everything possible to maintain its sole superpower status and prevent the emergence of a rival regional or global power. During his four years in office, President Bush managed a huge and complex agenda of difficult foreign policy issues with a sure touch. He found it difficult, however, to explain the changed international environment to the American public and did little to transform the US military and intelligence communities to deal with the changed world. Although his preoccupation with foreign policy may have cost him re-election, his defeat in 1992 ultimately led to his son occupying the White House eight years later. In the intervening years the White House was in Democratic hands under the leadership of William Jefferson Clinton, largely a novice in foreign policy, and the first truly post-Cold War President. Meanwhile Bush had presented a poisoned chalice to the new President. Africa had hardly figured during the Bush presidency but at the very end of his administration, the President agreed to send a small military force to war-torn Somalia, to support UN humanitarian assistance programs. Somalia was to become a major factor in the development of post-Cold War US foreign policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

President Bill Clinton

Foreign policy played little or no role in the 1992 election apart from Bill Clinton’s criticism of President Bush for paying too much attention to foreign as opposed to domestic policy. Clinton’s informal campaign slogan was “It’s the Economy – Stupid.’’ Clinton had also sniped at the Republicans for failing to do more on the human rights front in China and in the Balkans but in reality there were no major foreign policy differences between Clinton and Bush. Perhaps as a sign of the public’s lack of interest in foreign affairs, neither candidate was prepared to launch a national debate on what role the US should play in the post-Cold War world. Clinton’s victory occurred when there was much speculation about America’s decline. A headline in Time magazine on 15 October 1992 asked “is the US in an irreversible decline as the world’s premier power?” In the same month the French newspaper Le Monde published a twelve-part series on America in eclipse. A distinguished historian wrote a best seller depicting the likely decline of US power (Kennedy 1993). Americans were worried about the economic challenge from Japan. The glory of the Gulf War had faded fast and brought no lasting political benefits to George H. W. Bush.

As a former governor (like Carter and Reagan), Clinton had no foreign policy experience when he took office in January 1993. He made clear that domestic issues would have priority and appointed a foreign policy team (Anthony Lake as his national security adviser, Warren Christopher as Secretary of State) with clear instructions to keep foreign policy problems away from his desk. One public relations adviser, who served both Republican and Democrat Presidents, estimated that Clinton spent less than 25 percent of his time on foreign affairs, unlike Bush who had spent 75 percent of his time on foreign policy (Gergen 2002). When Clinton assumed office, however, the US faced no serious threats and there was no domestic pressure on the new President to take a more active role in foreign policy. There were, however, numerous foreign policy challenges awaiting Clinton, including the spreading conflict in the Balkans, the economic collapse in Russia, the breakdown of law and order in Haiti, several “rogue states” attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction and rising tension in the Middle East.

Clinton seemed to recognize that he was heading into uncharted waters. In his inaugural address in January 1993 he stated that “not since the late 1940s has our nation faced the challenge of shaping an entirely new foreign policy for a world that has fundamentally changed.” The President promised “bold new thinking” and a bipartisan approach in foreign policy. A few weeks later, speaking at the American University on 26 February, Clinton elaborated on these challenges and introduced globalization and cyberspace as two central features of his foreign policy. The President said that his priorities would be

– to restore the American economy to good health, “an essential prerequisite for foreign policy”

– to increase the importance attached to trade and open markets for American business

– to demonstrate US leadership in the global economy

– to help the developing countries grow faster

– to promote democracy in Russia and elsewhere. 

The President acknowledged that there were other challenges. The dangers we face are less stark and more diffuse than those of the Cold War, but they are still formidable – the ethnic conflicts that drive millions from their homes; the despots ready to repress their own people or conquer their neighbors; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Clinton added drugs, crime, AIDS and the environment for good measure.

Clinton’s principal advisers reiterated these priorities in all their speeches. The administration’s three primary policy objectives were promoting democracy, promoting prosperity, and enhancing security. Enlargement of the world’s ‘‘free communities of market democracies” was the stated rationale for the Clinton administration’s global posture. Given the fragility of emerging markets and democracies in Russia, Asia, and Latin America, especially during the late 1990s, the theme lost some of its appeal, only to make a strong comeback toward the end of the Clinton presidency. In two speeches, at Nebraska on 8 December 2000, and Warwick, in England on 14 December 2000, Clinton sought to claim a mantle of “progressive internationalist pragmatist” for his foreign policy legacy.

The President’s apparent lack of interest in foreign affairs caused some apprehension with America’s allies in Europe and Asia. To Asians, Clinton seemed preoccupied with NATO and Russia. To Europeans, however, Clinton seemed obsessed with correcting trade imbalances and opening markets in Asia. Despite his emphasis on domestic policy, Clinton soon found that there was no escape from the world outside. The new President could hardly have been confronted with three more difficult issues during his first months in office than Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans, problems that he inherited from Bush. The basic dilemma Clinton faced in all three cases was whether or not the US should intervene militarily to redress worsening humanitarian situations. With Haiti, Clinton faced a breakdown in law and order, after the ousting from power of the democratically elected President Aristide by General Rauol Cedras. Apart from some interest by the Black Caucus (black members of Congress), there was no significant American domestic constituency interested in Haiti. What prompted Clinton to intervene was the prospect of thousands of refugees seeking shelter and a permanent home in the US as a result of the violence on the island. The first attempt at landing a small military force on October 1993 was foiled by an unruly mob which led one historian to comment that “rarely had the US looked so impotent, its mighty military driven away from a banana republic by a pip-squeak dictator and a hired mob” (Halberstam 2001:271). A year later, Clinton ordered a larger invasion force to Haiti but just before the deadline for their landing, former President Jimmy Carter brokered a deal with General Cedras that allowed him to leave the island. This enabled American troops to land unopposed in order to restore order and to carry out peacekeeping duties, pending the return of Aristide. Clinton was able to proclaim a foreign policy “success” but Haiti would remain a problem country for the remainder of the decade.

The US intervention in Somalia, 1993–4, launched by one President and completed by another, had profound consequences for American foreign policy. For most of the Cold War, Somalia had sided with the Soviet Union and had been largely ignored by the US. But after the Soviet Union sided with Ethiopia against Somalia in the Ogaden War, a US-Somali rapprochement began in 1977 and culminated in a military access agreement in 1980 that permitted the US to use naval ports and airfields in exchange for military and economic aid. During the 1980s, the US viewed Somalia as a defense partner and many Somali officers were trained in America. Toward the end of the 1980s, however, Somalia disintegrated into civil war. The economy was in shambles, and hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes. During 1992 the fighting worsened and the images of homeless, starving women and children began to fill television screens thus increasing pressure on President Bush to send American troops to Somalia. This would later be cited as a good example of “the CNN effect.” A month after losing the 1992 presidential election to Clinton, Bush made a televised address to the nation officially announcing US participation in “Operation Restore Hope.” The former President stated that our mission has a limited objective – to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay longer than is absolutely necessary. He stated further that the US had no plans to dictate political outcomes in the war-torn East African nation.

Just days before President Bush’s announcement, Smith Hempstone, the US ambassador to Kenya, cautioned in a confidential cable to his State Department superiors that the US should think ‘‘once, twice, and three times” before getting involved in Somalia. He warned that Somalis are “natural-born guerrillas who would engage in ambushes and hit-and-run attacks. They will not be able to stop the convoys from getting through. But they will inflict – and take – casualties.” Referring to the ill-fated US intervention in Lebanon in 1982–3 that ultimately cost the lives of more than 260 marines, Hempstone concluded, “if you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu.” There was also considerable opposition within Congress to the administration’s decision to send American troops into a civil war situation. The Pentagon offered assurances, however, that American forces would not get bogged down in a Somalian quagmire. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, compared the US mission to having the cavalry ride to the rescue and then transferring responsibility to the “marshals” (i.e. UN peacekeepers) once the situation stabilized. The Pentagon also hoped that intervening in Somalia would ease the pressure to intervene in the much more difficult Balkans arena. In responding to the public’s demand “to do something,” the administration made sure that the initial military units that landed in Somalia in January 1993 were greeted by a blaze of television cameras. There were indeed ominous similarities between the situation in Lebanon during the early 1980s and the environment in Somalia: for example, politically fractured societies with an assortment of heavily armed militias backing various factions. As in the Lebanon, the US gradually became involved in the internal politics of Somalia – with equally fatal consequences. Although the US was in Somalia under UN auspices, its forces were never under UN command. Washington was also unwilling to coordinate its political and military objectives with UN headquarters. President Clinton, however, was persuaded to move from a policy objective of supporting humanitarian assistance to one of “nation building,” i.e. promoting democracy and political stability. As a result, Clinton agreed to a more robust military posture, at first with a view to disarming some of the local militias, and then capturing one noted warlord, Mohamed Farah Aideed. After a number of attacks on US forces in August 1993, Clinton ordered the elite Delta Rangers to capture Aideed. The attempt to do so, on 3 October, went horribly wrong with hundreds of Somalian casualties killed and wounded in a fierce gun battle in downtown Mogadishu. Eighteen American soldiers died, and seventy-seven were wounded. In the confusion Aideed escaped. The urban battle and loss of American lives resulted in sharp criticism of the President and his national security team. Public attitudes also changed overnight as the naked body of a US Ranger was shown on television being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. The President was in a difficult position. He warned “that if US troops were to leave now, we would send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans.” At the same time he set a deadline of 31 March 1994 for a political settlement in order that US troops could be withdrawn. In hoisting a diplomatic white flag, the President sought to place the blame on the United Nations. “We cannot let a charge we got under a UN resolution to do some police work – which is essentially what it is, to arrest suspects – turn into a military mission.” Republicans were highly critical of Clinton’s policy. Senator Nancy Kassebaum said “I can think of no further compounding of the tragedy that has occurred there for our forces than to have them withdraw and see what started out to be a very successful, noble mission end in chaos.” Congressman Dellums stated that “a terrible mistake was made. Rather than maintaining a neutral peacekeeping role for a famine-relief effort implemented by Bush, Clinton became enmeshed in urban combat. Cardinal rules were violated. We chose sides, and we decided who the enemies were.’’