Key Facts

Another critic, Thomas Friedman of The New York Times, wrote on 8 June 2001, “there is nothing wrong with coming in and saying we’re going to be tougher than the previous lot. But there is a fine line between a tougher effective foreign policy and a tougher ineffective foreign policy with no allies.” In another article on 30 July 2001, the same author regretted that the US was now perceived as “a rogue state.” Many people around the world look to America as the ultimate upholder of rules and norms. But the message that we have been sending to the world lately is that we do not believe in rules, we believe in power – and we’ve got it and you don’t.

The Bush administration’s preference for unilateralism was also criticized by Democrat Tom Dashle, the Senate majority leader. “We are isolating ourselves and in so doing we are minimizing ourselves.” President Bush was stung by this sustained criticism and responded that he was ‘‘plenty capable” of conducting US foreign policy (Washington Post, 20 July 2001). A more detailed defense of the administration came from national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, who countered that the Bush administration “was one hundred percent internationalist” and criticized policies under which “internationalism somehow becomes defined as signing on to bad treaties just to say that you have signed a treaty.” While accepting that the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol “could have been handled better,” she described the administration’s policy as the “new realism” (CBS Face the Nation, 29 July 2001). Richard Haass, the State Department’s policy planning director, also defended the administration’s approach arguing that the new policy was “à la carte multilateralism.” The US would assess each treaty or agreement on an individual basis and decide on participation purely on national interest (speech at Nixon Center, 26 July 2001). It was clear that Secretary of State, Colin Powell, was not happy with some of these initial policy stances and there was much media speculation about rifts between the State Department and the Pentagon (Time, 9 September 2001). But gradually the administration reversed or modified their initial policy pronouncements. This was done partly due to pressure from allies, partly due to widespread critical media coverage in the US and abroad, and partly due to recognition that there were not so many alternatives to the policies of the previous administration. For example, the new Treasury Secretary, Paul O’Neill, let it be known that he was opposed to bailouts for countries in financial distress. Yet the US participated in the IMF rescue package for Argentina in 2001. The talks with North Korea were restarted and there was a round of consultations with allies on missile defense. The debate and criticisms of American foreign policy ceased abruptly on 11 September 2001, the day of the tragic terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. As Bush and Powell prepared to assemble an international coalition to fight terrorism, the President’s father, George H. W. Bush, called for an end to unilateralism. In a speech at Boston on 14 September 2001, Bush senior said Just as Pearl Harbor awakened this country from the notion that we could somehow avoid the call to duty and defend freedom in Europe and Asia in World War II, so, too, should this most recent surprise attack erase the concept in some quarters that America can somehow go it alone in the fight against terrorism or in anything else for that matter. There was little sign, however, that Bush senior’s remarks were taken to heart by his son or his son’s foreign policy advisers. By early 2002 there was no evidence of changed US views on the Kyoto Protocol, the ICC, CTBT or other arms control treaties (see International Agreements rejected by US on p. 177). A fortnight after the attacks, Colin Powell said that the US would not let terrorism hijack American foreign policy. The US would continue to pursue a full international agenda. But it was clear that foreign policy henceforth would be conducted through a new prism. According to the President, the US would assess each country on the basis of whether it was with the US or against it in fighting international terrorism. This would lead the US into some strange alliances. 

Conclusion 

If one looks back at American history, it is not surprising that the US struggled to find a set of guiding principles for its foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. The differences and debates that may be observed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as regards idealism v. realism, unilateralism vs. multilateralism, are still on display today and it is unlikely that they will be resolved quickly even in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks. All three post-Cold War Presidents found it difficult to articulate a new strategy for the US. All were ready to intervene overseas to protect American interests. George H. W. Bush ensured public support for the Gulf War by linking it to American oil interests. Clinton was also ready to use military force, albeit reluctantly, for a mixture of motives, including humanitarian purposes. Clinton and George W. Bush differed in their approach toward multilateral institutions but the differences narrowed somewhat in the wake of the terrorist attacks and the need to secure international support to combat the terrorist threat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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